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Real World Cryptanalysis
Cryptographic Standards crucial for secure Internet
Gain confidence in security over time through extensive scrutiny
(Before & After Standardization)
Real World Cryptanalysis
Cryptographic Standards crucial for secure Internet
Occasionally leap in cryptanalysis exposes unknown weaknesses
Deprecate Standard !
Real World Cryptanalysis
Theory
Analyze
Practice
Build
Demonstrate
Apply
uint32_t w14_q20_nb = 0; 
for (unsigned l = 0; l < (1<<2); ++l) 
{ 
NEXT_NB(w14_q20_nb, W14NBQ20M); 
m14 &= ~W14NBQ20M; 
m14 |= w14_q20_nb; 
q15 += w14_q20_nb; 
q16 += rotate_left(w14_q20_nb, 5); 
m17 ^= rotate_left(m14, 1); 
m20 ^= rotate_left(m17, 1); 
uint32_t w15_q20_nb = 0; 
for (unsigned k = 0; k < (1<<5); ++k) 
{ 
NEXT_NB(w15_q20_nb, W15NBQ20M); 
m15 &= ~W15NBQ20M; 
m15 |= w15_q20_nb; 
m18 ^= rotate_left(m15, 1); 
q16 += w15_q20_nb;
Cryptographic hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions
A hash function is a deterministic mapping
from arbitrary length inputs to a fixed length output
This is an input to a 
cryptographic hash function. 
The input is a very long string, 
that is reduced by the hash 
function to a string of fixed 
length. There are additional 
security conditions: it should 
be very hard to find an input 
hashing to a given value (a 
preimage) or to find two 
colliding inputs (a collision). 
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MDC-2
MD2, MD4, MD5
SHA-1
old & weak
RIPEMD-160
SHA-2-{256,512}
secure
SHA-3-{256,512}
New Std in 2015
NIST: use SHA-2
hash / digest / 
fingerprint
Collision resistance
Collision resistance
Find𝑚 ≠ 𝑘 such that 𝐻 𝑚 = 𝐻 𝑘
Only max. (n/2)-bit security!
128-bit hash ⇒ 64-bit security
160-bit hash ⇒ 80-bit security
256-bit hash⇒ 128-bit security
512-bit hash⇒ 256-bit security
Note: 
Bitcoin network computes
• 264 SHA-2 / sec
• 280.5 SHA-2 / day
• 284 SHA-2 / 12days
• 289 SHA-2 / year
⇒
breaks 80-bit security 
brute-force in 1 day!
◦ Merkle-Damgård Construction
◦ Splits message into 512-bit blocks
◦ Processes blocks iteratively using compression function
◦ Security reduction
◦ collision hash function  collision compression function
Design of hash functions
MD5 / SHA-1 / SHA-256 compression function
MD5
very weak
permutation
SHA-1
theoretically weak
linear recurrence
SHA-2
secure
non-linear
message expansion
16 x 32-bit → {64,80} x 32-bit
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Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis
◦ Consider two different instances
Compress(CV,M)
Compress(CV’,M’)
◦ Analyze differences
Differential path
◦ Precise description of all 
differences propagating
through compression function
◦ Translate differential path
into system of equations to solve
to find M, M’
CV in
CV out
msg in
Differential cryptanalysis
System of equations
◦ Sufficient system of equations:
Applying the input differences
guarantees diff.path
◦ Simple equations
on message and state bits
Solve
◦ First 16 steps easily solved
⇒ all message bit equations fulfilled
◦ Make predictable small changes 
to solve up to step 24
(amortizes cost of earlier steps)
◦ Probabilistically fulfill
remaining steps 
(with many solutions up to step 24)
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Deprecating MD5 in 2008
(known to be practically broken since 2004)
Joint work with:
Alexander Sotirov, Jacob Applebaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Weger
Rogue C.A.
2008 [SSALMOdW]: Breakthrough on MD5
◦ Practical chosen-prefix collision attack on MD5
◦ Arbitrary different prefixes made to collide
hash
hash
Forgery
RSA
Rogue C.A.
Example chosen-prefix collision between
• Our website: 
https://i.broke.the.internet.and.all.i.got.was.this.t-
shirt.phreedom.org
• A hand-crafted sub-C.A. certificate
• Valid signature for both from Verisign!
Using 200 PlayStation 3s
Rogue C.A.
◦ Realistic Man-in-the-Middle attack against any secure website
◦ Responsible disclosure
◦ Pre-informed Browsers and C.A.s
◦ Rogue C.A. purposely crippled: only valid in August 2004
◦ MD5 deprecated within hours
◦ Software released for research
◦ Anyone can create chosen-prefix collisions
◦ ≈1 day on quadcore machine
◦ https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/hashclash
What happened since?
◦ 2009: CABforum: MD5 deprecated for signatures
◦ 2012: supermalware Flame uses forged MD5 signature
to push fake Windows Updates
Discovery of yet-unknown variant MD5 collision attack
◦ 2016: SLOTH: Transcript collision attacks against TLS, IKE, SSH
◦ 2017: Oracle JRE rejects MD5 signatures
Originally planned for Januari, was postponed till April
◦ 2018: US SWGDE (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence)
Publication “explains that the use of the MD5 and SHA1
hash algorithms remains acceptable”
Deprecating SHA-1 in 2017
(known to be weak since 2005)
Joint work with
Ange Albertini, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Yarik Markov
Weaknesses
SHA-1 is not collision resistant
Collision attack with complexity 269 (4M core-years) [WangYY 2005]
Later improved to 261 (15,300 core-years) [Stevens 2012]
Projected costs of SHA-1 collisions [Schneier 2012]
$2.77M   in  2012
$700K    by  2015
$173K   by  2018
$43K      by   2021
(based on [Stevens 2012], Amazon EC2 rates & Moore’s Law)
Practical SHA-1 collision remained open problem
⇒ “we can postpone 5 years..” 
GPU ≫ CPU
• [S13]: SHA-1 collision attack with complexity ≈ 261
• ⇒ CPU attack: 15.3K coreyears
• [SPK16]: attack complexity ≈ 262.2 on GTX-970
• ⇒ GPU attack: 112 GPUyears
• ≈ $100k renting fee (on Amazon EC2)
• ×𝟕 lower cost in 2015 than predicted earlier by Schneier
• Initiated collaboration with Google
First SHA-1 Collision
◦ Collaboration with Google [SBKAM17]
◦ Google Infrastructure:
Large heterogenous cluster of CPUs & GPUs
◦ But: no direct access, proprietary Compile & Job system
◦ ‘Blind’ adaptation source-code by Google
◦ First near-collision attack
◦ Took 3583 core years ≈ 𝟐𝟔𝟎 SHA-1 compressions
◦ Run on 100k+ PCs in several weeks
◦ Second near-collision attack
◦ Tailored to 1st NC output
◦ Using NVIDIA Tesla K20, K40, K80
◦ Took ≈ 114 K20years ≈ 71 K80years ≈ 𝟐𝟔𝟐.𝟖 SHA-1
◦ Run on >3000 GPUs in just 8 calendar days
◦ Collision on https://shattered.io/
Colliding PDFs
Reusable meaningful SHA-1 collision:
◦ 1 collision: infinite colliding PDF-pairs with distinct embedded JPGs
◦ Use JPG for page-content ⇒ arbitrary distinct page contents
◦ Use PDF image cropping ⇒ arbitrary distinct multi-page contents
◦ DIY: https://github.com/nneonneo/sha1collider
PDF header
JPEG header
JPEG comment
Image 1
collision blocks
File 1
length
length
File 2
PDF header
JPEG header
JPEG comment
length 2
length
Image 2
JPEG comment
Impact
• Project Webpage, Google Drive & Gmail check for SHA-1 collisions
• Unexpectedly collision can break Subversion repositories
• Webkit developer submitted test to prove WebKit resistant to SHA-1 collisions
• Broke Webkit repository
• Internal deduplication uses SHA-1 and keeps only 1 colliding file
• MD5 is used to check integrity ⇒will always fail on checkout
• Git started moving away from SHA-1
• Git & GitHub now using strengthened SHA-1 implementation by default
• CA/Browser Forum: Ballot 152
• Extend issuance SHA-1 certificates up to 1 Jan. 2017 (before: 1 Jan. 2016)
• (unaltered: deprecate SHA-1 certificates after 1 Jan. 2017)
• Our recommendations on 8 Oct. ensured Ballot did not pass on 16 Oct.
• TLS 1.3 draft 9
• Deprecated all uses of SHA-1 digital signatures
From attacks to toys
Instant Collisions
• Instant collision scripts for many file formats
• Instant, re-usable and generic collisions
• Take any pair of files, run script, get colliding files
• SHA-1: PDF, HTML
• MD5
• PDF
• PNG, JPG, JP2
• MP4, GIF
• PE (windows executable)
Toys
Toys
Hashquines: documents that show their own MD5 hash
Thank you!
